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ABSTRACT
Provenance management still lacks robust models for shar-
ing provenance data between multiple parties while keeping
parts of it private to the owner. This limits the potential for
provenance dissemination, which is a critical step in enabling
data sharing amongst partners with limited a priori mutual
trust. In turn, this has a negative impact on data-intensive
science and its associated research publication repositories,
on audit tasks, as well as on increasingly common collabora-
tive dynamic coalitions scenarios. We propose a method for
preserving privacy by creating abstractions over provenance
graphs, we apply it to provenance sharing, and illustrate it
on a health care case study.
1. INTRODUCTION
The provenance of data is a form of structured metadata
that records the activities involved in the production of the
data. In addition to activities, a provenance trace may in-
clude input or intermediate data products, as well as the
agents, humans as well as software systems, who were re-
sponsible for carrying out those activities. The history of
the data is captured by dependencies amongst these ele-
ments. In multi-party collaborations settings that involve
data sharing, as well as in third party auditing of data and
processes, there is a broad expectation that provenance can
be used to help data consumers form judgments regarding
the reliability of the underlying data. In scientific comput-
ing, for instance, the increasing complexity of the code that
is backing up research findings, together with the lack of for-
mal software engineering processes in producing that code,
is partially to blame for a large number of paper withdrawals
[7] and a general credibility crisis [18], as evidenced for in-
stance by major scandals such as ClimateGate [13]. Repro-
ducibility of research is hailed as the next big challenge for
computational sciences that will increase the confidence in
the research process and open it up to detailed scrutiny [17].
In this setting, repeatability is underpinned by the availabil-
ity of provenance, input data, and executable code. The
motivating example presented below combines data sharing
protocols in e-health with auditing requirements, in the con-
text of patient selection for clinical trials.
In a different context, the notion of dynamic coalitions [6]
has recently come to denote ad hoc collaborative partner-
ships that are created to pursue a common goal, in sce-
narios such as multi-agency emergency / threat responses.
Despite the need to share data of possibly sensitive nature,
these coalitions are characterized by a lack of established
interaction protocols and trust amongst the partners. In
this case, supplementing data exchanges with the exchange
of the associated provenance metadata may, in some cases,
compensate for the lack of trust.
For provenance to play a role in each of these scenarios, two
main obstacles must be overcome. Firstly, full disclosure of
provenance data may not be possible, e.g. due to Intellec-
tual Property restrictions connected to individual compo-
nents or data protection regulations, which introduces the
need for hiding certain parts of the provenance traces. Sec-
ondly, just as data is generated and disseminated in a dis-
tributed fashion across a network of partners, so is its as-
sociated provenance, which is naturally fragmented and re-
quires composition as it propagates along the network. The
work described in this paper addresses the combination of
these two common problems, namely how to compose and
disseminate fragments of provenance generated by multiple
partners, while enforcing privacy requirements defined by
each of those partners.
1.1 Motivating scenario
Consider the example of a provenance trace of a clinical trial
study design task, shown in Fig. 1. In a typical clinical re-
search study, multiple partners collaborate on the design,
by providing recruitment criteria and protocol details, in-
cluding finely grained parameters such as desired patients’
age, body-mass index (BMI), existing conditions and treat-
ments, all parameterised using specialised ontologies. These
eligibility queries are sent to the hospitals and GP surgeries
to find suitable patients. Even the smallest variation in the
query formulation may have a major impact on the number
of recruited patients and determine the success or failure of
the study.
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Figure 1: The Trial Eligibility scenario
When the request is sent from the research organization
(RO) to the data source (DS), additional metadata needs
to be provided to convince the recipient that the researcher
has been properly authenticated, and a part of the prove-
nance log is dispatched, abstracting over the study protocol
and criteria evolution details. Once the study has been com-
pleted, various governing bodies (GB) may decide to run an
audit of the process, to see if the researchers complied with
the national and international regulations pertaining to trial
conduct. For this purpose, GB requires RO to include de-
tails of the individual criteria and protocols that constitute
the study. However, only some parts of the provenance data
are passed on to the auditor, with the intermediate steps of
the eligibility criteria remaining internal to the research or-
ganization. This provenance, possibly combined with other
forms of knowledge that are available to GB, represents a
form of evidence that GB can leverage to verify regulatory
adherence.
Data provenance may also need to be composed and prop-
agated along the network of peers. In our example, this
occurs, when a DS sends the response to the RO, together
with the provenance information about the database the re-
sult was extracted from, for example dates of data collection,
geographic location, and socio-demographic profiles of the
patient population. Part of this provenance data will need
to be passed on to the GB for audit. For example, DS1
sends data d1 to RO along with its provenance p1, and RO
then produces some study results d2 based on d1, along with
its own provenance, p2. Logically, p1 becomes part of the
provenance of d2, because it includes the history of d1 and
d1 was used to produce d2. Thus, p1 and p2 are composed to
produce an overall provenance trace that spans the lifetime
of both d2 and d1. It is this compound provenance that RO
should send to GB, if d2 is requested as part of the audit.
1.2 Provenance trace of a clinical study
We now introduce the provenance graph example that shall
be used to demonstrate our approach. The EU FP7 TRANS-
FoRm project (transformproject.eu) defines a set of mod-
ular informatics components, including provenance, data in-
tegration, and security solution, that allow interoperability
between electronic health records, clinical trial data, and
knowledge bases for decision support. The provenance in-
frastructure is model-based and uses the business process
model to define abstract patterns for each client tool that
are then submitted to the provenance server, and then as-
sembled into concrete provenance graphs. Fig. 2 depicts one
such provenance graph that is generated by the Query For-
mulation workbench, that is part of the TRANSFoRm Trial
Recruitment software.
In the graph, we can see a clinical study (cS) that was cre-
ated by a user who got authenticated with some security
certificate. The study has associated with it a study proto-
col, cSP1, and two eligibility criteria (cSEC2 and cSEC4),
both of which were created and then subsequently edited.
Broadly speaking, the provenance of cS consists of all the
paths in the graph in which cS appears. In this work we will
rely on the rather comprehensive definition of data prove-
nance proposed by the W3C [2], which in Sec. 2 we simplify
for the purpose of our initial proof-of-concept implementa-
tion. Essentially, we view the provenance information as a
graph of relations involving data, data transformation ac-
tivities, and agents who are responsible for those activities
and for the data.
Using the convention that the direction of the edges point
“towards the past”, the graph includes two main types of
relations: activity a used e, where e is a piece of data (an
entity), and conversely, entity e wasGeneratedBy a, where
a is an activity (a process). Thus, one can traverse the
graph starting with any entity, e.g. cSEC2, and tracing its
provenance through activities (indicated by square boxes,
like SECE1) and their own data dependencies (cSEC1, cS)
all the way up to the security information used by the overall
process. The graph in the example also relates activities to
agents, for example lS wasAssociatedWith R. Note that
a dependency graph does not describe a business process,
rather it captures the unfolding of one specific instance of
such a process. The process specification is not captured in
the trace.
1.3 Assumptions and contributions
In the scenario just described, data producers and consumers
pursue potentially conflicting goals. On one side, consumers
have an interest to acquire rich provenance that they can
query and mine. In contrast, producers may not be prepared
to disclose all details of its internal processes, as we have seen
in our example. The resulting tension must be resolved if
useful information exchange is to take place. For produc-
ers, this translates into a goal of maximizing the amount
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Figure 2: Example provenance graph for defining a clinical study in TRANSFoRm
of provenance disclosed to consumers, consistent with their
privacy constraints. In this work we provide data producers
with an algorithm that lets them perform this trade-off by
computing a new provenance graph where sensitive infor-
mation is replaced by some abstraction. The specification
of sensitve information is captured in the form of a privacy
policy, consisting of a set of nodes which are not to be dis-
closed, which is the input to the algorithm. We assume that
none of the parties acts maliciously, and that the provenance
associated with the data is genuine, i.e., it has not been tam-
pered with. We show how abstracted views of dependency
graphs can be computed in a way that preserves proper-
ties of the dependency relations, and how the composition
of provenance graphs from different producers can itself be
abstracted and delivered to a consumer in a way that com-
plies with each of those producers’ different policies relative
to that consumer.
Concretely, the paper offers the following technical contri-
butions. In Sec. 2, we introduce a definition of abstraction
over dependency graphs that preserves the consistency of
the graph, defined by certain properties of the dependency
relations. We then define a graph abstraction function that
takes a user’s policy and edits an input provenance graph,
resulting in an abstracted view of the graph. This is the al-
gorithm used by a content producer such as DS. We then de-
scribe (Sec. 2.5) an early implementation using VDM [1, 14],
which is compatible with a core subset of the W3C PROV
provenance model [2]. The simple privacy policy used here,
consisting of just a set of nodes, provides a foundation for
experimenting with more expressive policy languages, which
will be needed to make the algorithm useful in practice. Ex-
tensions to the policy language are left for future work, how-
ever.
In Sec. 3 we address the problem of composing multiple
provenance graphs in combination with multiple abstrac-
tions, and multi-party provenance propagation. Each part-
ner may receive data from other partners, and use it to gen-
erate more data and thus more provenance. It combines the
latter with provenance of the data it has received, and shares
the result with other partners, using policies of the form in-
troduced in the first part of the paper. We assume that
each producer may specify a different policy for each of the
partners that its provenance may be distributed to. The ab-
straction function is used to compute different abstract views
over dependency graphs according to the different producer
policies.
1.4 Related work
Several strands of research are relevant to our work. The
first, largely motivated by the need to preserve privacy in
social network data, extends the well-known data anyno-
mization framework developed for relational data, to graph
data structures [19, 3, 15]. Here the main problem, also sum-
marised in a 2008 survey [20], is to ensure that various forms
of anonymization are robust to attacks from adversaries who
can potentially leverage their partial information about frag-
ments of the graph, to infer additional knowledge. Although
in our setting the problem of “de-abstracting” provenance
graphs is not our primary concern, this body of research will
indeed be a useful reference for future work. Closer to us
is a strand of research that investigates the problem of pre-
serving the privacy of functions used in workflows, when a
large number of input/output pairs for those functions is re-
vealed through the provenance traces of multiple executions
of the workflow. While this work on module privacy [11, 10,
9] applies anonymization techniques specifically to prove-
nance graphs, it is centred around a workflow-specific form
of provenance and is concerned with protecting the seman-
tics of workflow modules, and thus is still peripheral to our
interest.
Also centred on workflow provenance is the Zoom system [4]
for computing views over provenance graphs that contain
traces of dataflow execution (a “run”). Views, which are ef-
fectively a form of abstraction, are computed based on the
user’s indication of which workflow modules (tasks) are rele-
vant, or perhaps based on which modules a user is allowed to
see. This is similar to our work in two ways. Firstly, a view
is an answer to a provenance query, which accounts for users
preferences and privileges. While provenance sharing poli-
cies are not a part of the model and thus are not mentioned
explicitly, it is easy to imagine our policies providing input to
the view generator. Secondly, Zoom too has a notion of con-
sistency, i.e., views must be valid provenance graphs. The
main difference with our work is that in Zoom, provenance
views are really a by-product of user views over the workflow
whose execution the provenance graph represents, whereas
our approach is based on a “PROV-lite” provenance model
that makes no assumptions on the structure of the process
that generates the graph.
Closer to our abstraction model, both in motivation and
in its technical approach, is the ProPub system [12], which
computes views over provenance graphs that are suitable
for publication by meeting certain privacy requirements. In
ProPub, users specify edit operations on a graph, such as
anonymizing, abstracting, and hiding certain parts of it (here
the term“abstracting” is interpreted as“zooming out”, much
as in [4]). Such operations are specified as logic rules, and
are interpreted natively by the Datalog-based prototype im-
plementation. ProPub adopts an “apply–detect–repair” ap-
proach, whereby user rules are applied to the graph first,
then consistency violations that may occur in the resulting
new graph are detected, and a final set of edits are forced on
the graph to try and repair such violations. In some cases,
this causes nodes that the user wanted removed to be rein-
troduced, and it is not always possible to satisfy all rules. In
contrast, our user policies are more simply a set of nodes to
be abstracted (but note that anonymizing and hiding are a
particular case of those). However, in return for this simplic-
ity, our algorithm is guaranteed to always produce a valid
abstract graph while ensuring that the nodes specified in the
policy are removed. This is achieved primarily by augment-
ing such policy nodes with new nodes, as described in detail
in the next section. In order to further clarify the relation-
ship between the two approaches, in Appendix A we show
how our algorithm computes an abstraction over the same
example graph used in the ProPub paper.
2. ABSTRACTINGPROVENANCEGRAPHS
We concentrate on the role of the data and provenance pro-
ducer, and make concrete the types of sharing policies that
a producer applies to each consumer (we use the term part-
ner to denote either producers or consumers). Each partner
maintains a set of policies, one for each partner to which it
sends information. The sharing policy that applies to mes-
sages sent by partner X to Y , denoted pol(X,Y ), is a set
of graph nodes {n1 . . . nk} which X wants to remove from
the graph before transmitting it to Y . In this section we
focus on two partners. This is later extended in Sec. 3 to
provenance graphs exchanged across mutiple parties. We
present an abstraction algorithm that creates a valid new
provenance graph in which the desired nodes are abstracted
into a single node. In order to preserve the semantics of the
provenance graph, other nodes may have been included as
well, but we ensure that none of the nodes in the policy set
are ever left in the graph. This is consistent with the general
goal of maximising the amount of provenance that is shared,
consistent with the producer’s sharing policy.
2.1 Definitions
We begin with a definition of provenance graphs, which we
restrict to a small subset of the node-types and relations
available in the full provenance language [2].
Definition 1 (Provenance Graph). A Provenance
Graph is a Directed Acyclic Graph (V ert, Edg) such that
V ert = E ∪ A, where E and A are finite disjoint sets
of entites (data) and activities, and Edg = U ∪ G where
U ⊆ (A× E) and G ⊆ (E ×A).
We will use e and a to refer to elements of E (entities) and A
(activities) respectively, and we will use n (for node) to refer
to an element of E ∪ A. The intuition behind Definition 1
is as follows: E is the set of data nodes, and A is the set of
activity nodes. U is the used relation: if (a, e) ∈ U then we
say that a used e (or that e is an input to activity a.) G is
the was-generated-by relation: if (e, a) ∈ G then we say that
e was generated by a (or that e is an output from activity a.)
The restriction to Directed Acyclic Graphs in Def. 1 reflects
the common intuition made of provenance graphs, that there
are no cyclic dependencies amongst causal relations.1
Definition 2 (Precedence and paths). For any
provenance graph, if (n2, n1) ∈ Edg, we say that node n1
directly precedes node n2. If (n2, n1) ∈ Edg+, we say that
node n1 indirectly precedes node n2. An alternative is the
infix notation: n1 < n2. If for all i ∈ 1..m−1 it is the case
that (ni, ni+1) ∈ Edg, then (n1, . . . nm) forms a path.
1Note however that more expressive provenance graphs ex-
pressible in the PROV model [2], which include relations
which are not dependencies amongst entities and activities,
may in some cases contain cycles. This work is not concerned
with non-causal provenance relations between entities and
activities.
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Figure 3: Cause and effect boundary nodes
These dependencies capture temporal order: if n1 < n2 then
n1 was created earlier (in the case of an entity) or executed
earlier (in the case of an activity) in time than n2
2. A path
travels forwards in time, from cause to effect.
The cause boundary nodes of a set of nodes are the points at
which a path through the provenance graph enters the set.
The effect boundary nodes are the points at which a path
through the graph leaves the set.
Definition 3 (Cause boundary nodes). If P ⊆ V ert
is a set of nodes in a provenance graph, then n ∈ P is a
cause boundary node provided there exists a node n′ such
that n′ 6∈ P ∧ (n, n′) ∈ Edg. (n, n′) is referred to as an
in-edge of P .
Definition 4 (Effect boundary nodes). If P ⊆ V ert
is a set of nodes in a provenance graph, then n ∈ P is an ef-
fect boundary node provided there exists a node n′ such that
n′ 6∈ P ∧ (n′, n) ∈ Edg. (n′, n) is referred to as an out-edge
of P .
Cause and effect boundary nodes are identified from the
point of view of the creation of the provenance trail, and
define the points at which paths may enter and leave a set
of nodes. For example, the provenance graph in Fig. 3 has
been created from left to right. Within the set of nodes
{a1, e4, e5, a4} the cause boundary nodes are {a1, e5} and
the effect boundary nodes are {e4, a4}. Cause boundary
nodes and effect boundary nodes are referred to as boundary
nodes.
An unbroken set is a set of nodes in which no effect boundary
node precedes a cause boundary node.
Definition 5 (Unbroken sets). A set of nodes N is
unbroken provided for all cause boundary nodes ni ∈ N ,
there does not exist an effect boundary node no ∈ N such
that no < ni.
2 This is a slight simplification over the PROV model cited
earlier, where usage and generation are events and a prece-
dence relation is defined over events, rather than over time,
to account for possibly inconsistent timestamps across mul-
tiple provenance generators. Such complete definition of the
precedence relation can be found in [8].
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Figure 4: A broken set
In Fig 4, a broken set {a1, a2, e4, e3} is identified. Within
this set, a1 is a cause boundary node and e4 is an effect
boundary node. Node a2 is a cause (because of the rela-
tionship (a2, e3),) and an effect boundary node (because of
the relationship (e5, a2)). Similarly a4 is both a cause and
an effect boundary node. The set is broken because a2 (an
effect boundary node) precedes a4 (a cause boundary node.)
The set depicted in Fig. 3 is an unbroken set.
Definition 6 (a-chunk). If N is a set of nodes in a
provenance graph and N is an unbroken set, then N is an
a-chunk provided all boundary nodes in N are a-nodes.
Definition 7 (e-chunk). If N is a set of nodes in a
provenance graph and N is an unbroken set, then N is an
e-chunk provided all boundary nodes in N are e-nodes.
We now define a simple abstraction function on provenance
graphs. When an abstraction operation is performed on a
graph, we use the term concrete to refer to the graph be-
fore the operation, and abstract to refer to the graph after
abstraction.
Definition 8 (Step-Abstraction). For any prove-
nance graph (V ert, Edg), a step-abstraction is a provenance
graph (V erta, Edga) in which either a single a-chunk (resp.
e-chunk) N is replaced by an abstract a-node (resp. e-
node) n, and (i) for all n1, n2 ∈ N , (n1, n2) is removed
from Edg; (ii) for all (n1, n2) ∈ Edg where n1 ∈ N and
n2 6∈ N , (n1, n2) is replaced with (na, n2), and (iii) for all
(n1, n2) ∈ Edg where n1 6∈ N and n2 ∈ N , (n1, n2) is re-
placed with (n1, na).
In the above definition, (i) ensures that each edge wholly
contained within N is removed altogether, and (ii) and (iii)
that links between nodes inside and outside of N continue to
be recorded, with the appropriate change of name. An algo-
rithm (Alg. 1.) to perform a single step-abstraction is given.
An abstraction is formed as a sequence of step-abstractions.
Definition 9 (Abstraction). An abstraction of
(V ert, Edg) is a new DAG (V erta, Edga) together with a
total abstraction function Abs : V ert → V erta, and its
inverse relation Con ⊆ V erta×V ert such that (i) for all na
in V erta, Con(na) is an a-chunk or an e-chunk, if na is an
abstract node, or a singleton set if not; (ii) (na, n
′
a) ∈ Edga
provided na 6= n′a and there exists (n, n′) ∈ Edg such that
Abs(n) = na and Abs(n
′) = n′a (iii) Edg
+
a is acyclic.
The intuition behind abstraction is as follows: (i) Each
newly created node na is formed either by abstracting an
a-chunk or an e-chunk. The concrete set of abstracted nodes
is represented by the set Con(na). (ii) The abstracted rela-
tions lose only the links covered completely by an element of
the partition: other links are renamed by the Abs function.
(iii) There are no cycles. The abstraction does not break the
usual precedence rule associated with provenance graphs 3.
When abstracting nodes, it is possible to create a false de-
pendency : i.e. to create a path in the abstract graph that
does not have a counterpart in the concrete graph. This has
an implication for the receiver, who may then make infer-
ences of the abstracted graph which are not justified by the
original data.
Definition 10. A false dependency appears in an ab-
straction if there exists (n1, n2) ∈ Edg+a such that (n1, n2) 6∈
Edg+.
Theorem 1. Checking that a step abstraction introduces
no false dependencies is equivalent to checking that for the
abstract node na created in the step, the chunk formed by
Con(na) is causally total, where a chunk is causally-total
provided for all cause boundary nodes nc and effect boundary
nodes ne it is the case that all paths nc → · · · → ne are in
the concrete graph.
Proof. Consider a graph (V ert, Edg), and an ab-
stracted counterpart (V erta, Edga) that contains a path
(n1 . . . nabs . . . n2) ∈ Edg+a . Assume (n1, n2) 6∈ Edg+ (i.e.
that (n1 . . . nabs . . . nn) is a false dependency.) There must
exist concrete nodes nc, ne ∈ Con(nabs), and so the paths
(n1, nc) and (ne, n2) must exist in the concrete graph (since
(n1, nabs) and (nabs, n2) exist in the abstract graph.) If there
is no path (n1 . . . n2) in the graph, then (since (n1, nc) and
(ne, n2) are both in Edg
+), (nc, ne) must not be in Edg
+,
and so Con(nabs) is not causally total.
If, on the other hand, if Con(nabs) is causally total, then
(nc, ne) ∈ Edg+, and so (by a similar argument to above)
(n1, n2) ∈ Edg+.
2.2 Abstraction at work
The declarative definition of step abstraction (Def. 8) has
an operational counterpart in operator abs:
abs(pg , Remove) (1)
which takes a provenance graph pg and a set Remove of
nodes, and computes a new abstracted, valid graph in which
a superset of Remove is replaced by an abstract node graph,
as described above. The pseudo-code for the abstraction op-
erator is shown in Alg. 1. The algorithm consists of two
phases. In the first phase, the Remove set is extended
3But please note footnote 2.
Algorithm 1 Given a Provenance Graph PG and set of
nodes {n1, . . . nn} to combine into a single node, computes
the smallest superset of these of nodes which when hidden
will result in a sound graph. These are removed and replaced
by nabs which has type a-node.
1: Remove := {n1, . . . nn}
2: repeat
3: Remove′ := Remove
4: Remove :=Extend to a-nodes(Remove)
5: In := Cause subset(Remove)
6: Out := Effect subset(Remove)
7: Remove := {n|ni ≤ n ≤ no.ni ∈ In ∧ no ∈ Out}
8: until Remove = Remove′
9: V ert := V ert ∪ nabs
10: for all n ∈ In do
11: for all n′ 6∈ Remove • used(n, n′) ∈ PG.used do
12: replace used(n, n′) with used(nabs, n′) in PG.used
13: end for
14: end for
15: for all n ∈ Out do
16: for all n′ 6∈ Remove • wgb(n′, n) ∈ PG.wgb do
17: replace wgb(n′, n) with wgb(n′, nabs) in PG.wgb
18: end for
19: end for
20: V ert := V ert \Remove
until an a-chunk is obtained4. This involves the following
steps. Firstly, the a-nodes related to the boundary nodes
of Remove (line 4) are added to Remove. Secondly, the
causal and effect boundary nodes for this new set are iden-
tified (lines 5 and 6). Finally (line 7), the nodes in the path
between any pair of causal and effect boundary nodes are
also added. In the second phase, all nodes in Remove are
replaced with a new, abstract node, and the surrounding
nodes are properly connected to it using the correct relation
types.
We illustrate the algorithm at work on the provenance
graph of Fig. 2, illustrated in Sec. 1.1. Suppose that
the graph is generated by the Research Organisation (RO)
which sends it to the Data Source (DS), subject to shar-
ing policy pol(RO,DS) = R1 where R1 = {CSD ,SECD1}.
Thus, initially Remove = Remove ′ = {CSD ,SECD1}.
Extend to a-nodes(CSD ,SECD1 ) does not change the
set, since both are already a-nodes. In lines 5 and 6, the
cause and effect boundary subsets of this set are calculated,
which are also both {CSD ,SECD1}. The intersection of
their precedents and consequents consists of the nodes them-
selves, together with any nodes which lie on a path between
them. In this case the node cS is added, so the new set is
{CSD, cS, SECD1}. Since this is not the same as Remove ′
the execution returns to line 2 with the set Remove now the
set {CSD, cS, SECD1}.
On the second traversal the extension to a-nodes propa-
gates the set to {CSD, cS, SECD1, SECD2, SPD}. The ef-
fect boundary nodes are {SECD1, SECD2, SPD} and the
cause boundary node is {CSD}. The intersection of their
precedents and consequents is equal to the Remove set, and
so the new abstract node ABS is added to the set (line
9). Lines 10-14 take all the cause boundary nodes (only
CSD in this case) and replace the relations used(CSD , cST )
4The algorithm described here considers a-chunk expansions
but it can be easily changed to compute e-chunk expansions.
Algorithm 2 Effect subset; Input: a set of nodes N ;
Output: a set of nodes M ⊆ N such that M is the subset of
N which are effect boundary nodes. Intent: to retain only
the effect boundary nodes wrt the DAG ordering in a set.
The effect boundary nodes are later in time than the cause
boundary nodes
1: M := ∅
2: for all n ∈ N do
3: if ∃n′.n′ 6∈ N ∧ (n, n′) ∈ Edg then
4: M :=M ∪ {n}
5: end if
6: end for
7: output M
Algorithm 3 Cause subset; Input: a set of nodes N ; Out-
put: a set of nodes M ⊆ N such that M is the subset of N
which are cause boundary nodes. Intent: to retain only the
cause boundary nodes wrt the DAG ordering in a set
1: M := ∅
2: for all n ∈ N do
3: if ∃n′.n′ 6∈ N ∧ (n′, n) ∈ Edg then
4: M :=M ∪ {n}
5: end if
6: end for
7: output M
and used(CSD , lS) with used(ABS , cST ) and used(ABS , lS)
respectively. Lines 15-19 go through the same process
for the effect boundary nodes, this time replacing the
relations wgb(SECD1 , cSEC1 ), wgb(SECD2 , cSEC3 ) and
wgb(SPD , cSP) with wgb(ABS , cSEC1 ), wgb(ABS , cSEC3 )
and wgb(ABS , cSP) respectively. Finally (line 20) the set
Remove ({CSD, cS, SECD1, SECD2, SPD}) is removed.
The result is shown in Fig. 5.
ABS
cST
cSEC3 cSPcSEC1
SECE1 SECE2
cSEC2 cSEC4
lS
usedused
usedused
wgbwgb
wgbwgb
wgb
... ...
Con(ABS) =
{CSD,cS,SECD1, SECD2,SPD}
Figure 5: Result of abstracting over R1 =
{CSD,SECD1}
2.3 Introducing Agents
We have developed the core of our work for the two pri-
mary types in a provenance graph – entities and activities.
Extending this scope to take account of the richness of the
PROV language is part of our future work. In this section we
Algorithm 4 Extend to a-nodes: Input a set of nodes
N . Output: The minimal extension of N to include a-nodes
at the boundary, except where the boundary the extension
is also the boundary of the underlying dependency graph.
1: for all n ∈ Effect subset(N) do
2: if n ∈ e-nodes then
3: N := N ∪ {a|wgb(n, a)}
4: end if
5: end for
6: for all n ∈ Cause Subset(N) do
7: if n ∈ e-nodes then
8: N := N ∪ {a|used(a, n)}
9: end if
10: end for
indicate how such extensions can be managed, by extending
the definition of dependency graphs to include agents and
three important agent-based relations: attribution, associa-
tion and delegation. Entities may be attributed to agents,
activities may be associated with agents and agents may del-
egate to other agents. These relations are all included in
Defn 11, which is an extension of Defn. 1.
Definition 11 (Extended Provenance Graph).
An Extended Provenance Graph is DAG (V ert, Edg) such
that V ert = E ∪ A ∪ Ag, where E, A and Ag are finite
disjoint sets of data, activities and agents respectively;
Edg = U ∪ G ∪ Atr ∪ Ass ∪ Del where U ⊆ (A × E) and
G ⊆ (E × A), Atr ⊆ (Ag × E), Ass ⊆ (Ag × A) and
Del ⊆ (Ag ×Ag).
Del(ag1, ag2) means agent ag2 delegated to ag1 ; the other
relations are unambiguous. The abstraction algorithm may
be extended to incorporate agents by allowing the sender to
identify agents to be removed. The extended procedure is
given in Alg. 5 and works as follows:
1. Ignoring agents and their relations, perform algo-
rithm 1 on the concrete graph. A new node nabs will
be created.
2. Remove agents which have been identified for removal,
and the relevant relations. (Alg. 5 lines 1-6.)
3. For any remaining agent ag and removed node n, re-
place all relations atr(ag ,n) and and ass(ag ,n) with
atr(ag ,nabs) and ass(ag ,nabs) respectively. (Alg. 5
lines 7-12.)
4. Remove orphan agents: remove all agents which do not
appear in rng(del) or dom(atr) or dom(ass). (Alg. 5
lines 13-22.)
If an agent is removed from the middle of a delegation chain,
the agents higher up the chain may be orphaned. We have
chosen to explicitly break delegation chains, and so these
orphan agents are removed. Another straightforward possi-
bility for encoding is that they are joined to their nearest
successor.
2.4 Composing multiple step abstractions
Observe that, since the abs operator (1) generates a prove-
nance graph, it should be possible to functionally compose
abs with itself, i.e., by computing
abs(abs(pg , R1), R2) (2)
Algorithm 5 Removing a chosen set of agents: In-
put: An abstracted provenance graph and the name of the
abstracted node nabs, a set of agents AG to remove, and
the set Remove of names of nodes that have been removed
by Alg. 1. Output: The abstracted provenance graph, with
agents AG removed together with their relationships.
1: for all ag ∈ AG do
2: for all n ∈ V ert do
3: remove {atr(ag, n), ass(ag, n), del(ag, n)}
4: end for
5: end for
6: remove AG from V ert
7: for all ag ∈ V ert do
8: for all n ∈ Remove do
9: replace atr(ag, n) with atr(ag, nabs) in PG.atr
10: replace ass(ag, n) with ass(ag, nabs) in PG.ass
11: end for
12: end for
13: orphans := ∅
14: repeat
15: orphans′ := orphans
16: for all ag ∈ V ert do
17: if ag 6∈ rng(PG.del) ∧ ag 6∈ dom(PG.ass) ∧ ag 6∈
dom(PG.atr) then
18: orphans := orphans ∪ {ag}
19: end if
20: end for
21: until orphans = orphans′
22: V ert := V ert \ orphans
for two policy sets, R1, R2. This is important as it provides
users with finely grained control over abstraction. To see
this, observe that abs is designed to work best when the
nodes to be abstracted out are close to each other in the
graph, as nodes that are far apart will result in many ad-
ditional intermediate nodes to be coalesced in the process5
(“coarsely grained” abstraction). This is not always the in-
tended effect of abstraction, however. Suppose for instance,
continuing with the example from Fig. 5 where the set of
nodes in R1 = {CSD,SECD1} was abstracted, that the
user wants to also abstract the set R2 = {SECE2, cSEC4}.
If the union of these nodes was removed from the original
graph, this would result in a large abstraction that would
include the node cSEC3, amongst others.
In contrast, consider the effect of sequential composition.
The first step results in the graph pg ′ = abs(pg , R1) shown
in Fig. 5, where the single abstract node ABS is abstract-
ing over Con(ABS) = {CSD, cS, SECD1, SECD2, SPD}.
One can then apply R2 to pg
′ to compute abs(pg ′, R2) shown
in Fig. 6, with the second abstract node ABS′ added. Ap-
plying a single abstraction over R1 ∪ R2 would have led to
node cSEC3 being abstracted out, while the composition
of separate abstractions on R1 and R2 results in a graph
that still contains cSEC3. Since there is no overlap be-
tween extensions of R1 and R2, in this case the two ab-
stractions are independent of one another. This is not al-
ways the case, however. For instance, suppose again that
pg ′ = abs(pg , R1), but now the second policy set to be
5In the worst case, abstracting the input and output nodes
of a computation simply results in one comprehensive node
that summarizes the entire provenance history. On the other
hand, if only a single activity node is abstracted, the effect
is simply to rename (anonymize) that node, or to remove
the value of some of its properties.
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... ...
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Con(ABS) = {CSD,cS,SECD1, SECD2,SPD}
Con(ABS') = {SECE2, cSEC4}
used
Figure 6: Applying R2 = {SECE2, cSEC4} after R1
applied is R3 = {SECD2, SECE2}. Since SECD2 is no
longer part of pg ′, having been abstracted out in the previ-
ous step, one cannot simply compute abs(pg ′, R3).
The strategy we propose is to replace the node in the policy
restriction with the node that abstracts it in the new graph.
So, if SECD2 is replaced with ABS in R3, the new policy
set R′3 = {ABS, SECE2} can be applied to pg ′, resulting in
pg ′′ = abs(pg , R′3)
which contains the new abstract node ABS′ abstracting over
Con(ABS′) = {ABS, cSEC3, SECE2}, as shown in Fig.7.
ABS'
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cSEC4 cSPcSEC1
SECE1
cSEC2
lS
usedused
used
wgbwgb
wgb
wgb
... ...
Con(ABS') = {ABS, SECE2, cSEC3}
Figure 7: Applying R3 = {SECD2, SECE2} after R1
These considerations suggest that we can simply use the
mapping Abs : V ert → V erta defined as part of the ab-
straction process (Def. (9)), to replace each node mentioned
in a policy such as R3, with its corresponding abstract node
produced by the previous application of the abs operator.
Let AbsM be the Abs function created from an application
of abstraction using policy setM . The replacement function
ρ(.) for a policy set R is a comprehension:
ρ(R,AbsM ) = {AbsM (n)|n ∈ R}
for any policy M (recall from Def. (9) that AbsM (n) = n
for any non-abstract node n).
In our running example, we have AbsR1(n) = ABS for
n ∈ {CSD, cS, SECD1, SECD2, SPD}, and AbsR1(n) = n
for all other nodes. Thus, ρ({SECD2, SECE2}, AbsR1) =
{ABS, SECE2}. This is the new policy set that should be
used for the second application of Abs.
Using ρ(.), we define a new composable version
absC(pg , R,AbsM ) of abs, as:
absC(pg , R,Abs) = abs(pg , ρ(R,Abs)) (3)
In our example, absC(absC(pg , R1, I), R3, AbsR1) produces
the graph in Fig. 7 (I is the identity function, used for the
first application of abs to pg). Note that absC reduces to
abs when applied to non-abstract graphs. As a final note,
observe that in our example we have
abs(abs(pg , R1, I), R2,AbsR1) =
absC(absC(pg , R2, I), R1, AbsR2).
We conjecture, without proof, that absC is indeed commu-
tative.
The ability to compose abstractions provides users with a
choice, between an abstraction semantics where a policy set
is applied as a whole, and one where different partitions of
the policy set are applied in sequence, using composition.
The former leads to potentially large subsets of the nodes
being abstracted out, while the second results in more finely
grained control over the set of nodes that are abstracted
out. The case of multiple sets of nodes arises naturally when
a graph is abstracted according to multiple, independent
sharing policies (each possibly consisting of a single set).
This scenario is discussed in the next section.
2.5 Prototype implementation
We have encoded the PROV subset discussed as a model
within the Vienna Development Method (VDM) specifica-
tion language [1, 14]. The algorithms are encoded function-
ally using an executable subset of the modelling language,
allowing models of provenance to be readily analysed using
the Overture interpreter. VDM benefits from strong tool
support and has been used similarly to its use here in the
modelling and analysis of access control policies [5]. The
open source tool set (Overture6) includes a syntax and type
checker, an interpreter for executable models, test script-
ing and coverage analysis facilities, program code genera-
tion and pretty-printing. These have the potential to form
a platform for tools specifically tailored to the analysis of
provenance policies in a PROV-compliant framework. Ad-
vanced static analysis for VDM models includes automatic
proof obligation generation and automated proof support is
under development. The development of automated trans-
lation from PROV-N (the relational syntax used by PROV)
to VDM models and vice versa is under way.
3. PROVENANCE COMPOSITION AND
QUERY
6http://overturetool.org
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Figure 8: Multi-party provenance exchanges with
trusted partner
The provenance abstraction algorithm described in the pre-
vious section defines an operator on provenance graphs, that
can be used to enforce a sender privacy policy which reg-
ulates the exchange of provenance between two parties. In
this section we build on this work and discuss a typical usage
of abstraction. We outline a model for propagating prove-
nance across a network of partners, under the assumption
that each partner may define a different sender privacy pol-
icy relative to each other partner. We argue for the need for
dependency graph composition, we define a simple compo-
sition operator that is adequate for our provenance model,
and analyse the interplay of such an operator with the ab-
straction operator.
3.1 Multi-party interaction pattern
Consider the stereotypical interaction pattern of Fig. 8, in
which three partners, A, B, and C can send and receive data
values and can generate provenance graphs corresponding to
the computation of those values. A distinguished mutually
trusted partner, T (this may be one of the senders/receivers)
is in charge or managing the graphs on behalf of the entire
coalition, and of ensuring that each partner will only see
views over the provenance graphs, which are consistent with
the policies.
In this pattern, we represent data production at A and B
using the two functions f and g, respectively, where y′ =
g(y, . . . ) denotes that the new data value y′ depends in part
on y. Initially, A computes y = f(x) and sends y to B,
then B uses y (along with other local data) to compute y′ =
g(y, . . . ). Let pgf and pgg denote the provenance graphs
associated with the computation of y = f(x) and y′ = g(y),
respectively, and assume that A and B send their respective
graphs to T . At some later time, B sends y′ to C. C can
then issue a query to T asking for the provenance prov(y′)
of y′.
As we have assumed throughout this work, the disclosure of
provenance information by A and B to C is regulated by
privacy policies, which are defined independently for each
pair of partners. Let pol(X,Y ) denote the privacy policy
that defines the abstraction of X’s graph that Y is allowed
to see. Recall that absC(pg , pol(X,Y )) denotes the result
of abstracting out graph pg according to policy pol(X,Y ).
We assume that T has unrestricted access to all provenance
graphs produced by each of the other partners, and that it
has full knowledge of pol(X,Y ) for each pair X,Y . In or-
der to respond to a provenance query, such as the one from
C, T must (i) compose all provenance graphs that may be
relevant to the query (pgf and pgg), and (ii) compute an ab-
straction that conforms with all the policies, i.e., pol(A,C)
and pol(B,C) in the example7.
3.2 Composition and abstraction
Consider the two graphs pgf and pgg introduced earlier. In
this simple example, we expect such graphs (Fig. 8) to be
pgy = ({y, g, y′}, {u(g, y), g(y′, g)}), and similarly for pgf 8.
Taken on its own, prov(y′) consists of all the paths in pgy
that originate in node y′, in this case only path y′ → g → y.
In turn, by the same construction prov(y) contains path y →
f → x. Clearly, the two paths can be combined to form a
more complete path that is arguably part of the provenance
of y′, namely y′ → g → y → f → x (Fig. 9(a)). The
composition operator:
pg1 ⊕ pg2
combines two provenance graphs pg1, pg2 so that such com-
posite provenance can be computed. The simple definition
of composition given below takes the union of the nodes and
edges of the two component graphs, and will suffice for our
purposes, with the exception discussed below.
Definition 12 (Provenance Graph Composition).
Let g1 = (V ert1, Edg1), g2 = (V ert2, Edg2)) be two prove-
nance graphs. The compound graph g = g1 ⊕ g2 is
g = (V ert1 ∪ V ert2, Edg1 ∪ Edg2).
As a side note, observe that this definition assumes that all
partners agree on using a common naming scheme for the
data they exchange. For example, pgf and pgg correctly
“join” on y only if the producers of each of the two graphs
agree to use the same identifier for y. If each partner follows
a local naming scheme, as is commonly the case, then their
provenance graphs will reflect that scheme, and mappings
from local to shared identifiers are required. Here we assume
that suitable mappings from the local to the shared naming
scheme are applied prior to provenance graphs being sent
to T , so that the identifier used to send data, such as y,
matches the references to y that appear in pgf . We refer to
prior work [16] for an in-depth analysis that shows the need
for such mappings in the specific scenario of data sharing
through a repository.
Consider the set of join nodes VJ = V ert1 ∩ V ert2. When
VJ = ∅, composition simply results in two disconnected
graph components, and no new paths appear in the prove-
nance of the final data. Fig. 9(b) shows a more interesting
example where g makes use of one of y’s inputs:
y = f(x1, x2), y
′ = g(y, x2)
and VJ = {x2, y}. In this example the composition shows,
correctly, that x2 was used twice, once by f and once by g.
In other cases, composition may result in a new graph that
is intuitively inconsistent. Suppose for instance that part-
ner A computes two values: 〈y1, y2〉 = f(x), then it sends
7Observe that pol(A,B) only comes into play when B
queries T for prov(y).
8This a minimalistic graph. Additional details on the inter-
nal structure of f and g may be included.
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Figure 9: Simple compositions of dependency
graphs
y1 to B who computes y2 = g(y1). Now VJ = {y1, y2},
but the compound graph shows y2 to have been gener-
ated twice. In this example, this is indicative of a prob-
lem between A and B, who each claim to have generated
y2. While explaining such “collisions” is out of the scope
of our work, it is important that they be detected, i.e., by
introducing consistency constraints on the graphs. Indeed,
a number of such constraints are defined formally as part of
the PROV family of specifications [8]. Consistent with our
limited definition of dependency graphs, which simply con-
siders the usage and generation relations amongst graph
nodes, we introduce one single constraint that is relevant
for these relations, namely that each entity shall be gener-
ated by at most one activity (this is essentially Constraint
25 in [8]). This translates into the condition that any en-
tity node be the source of at most one generation edge,
that is, a graph dg = (V ert, Edg) where e, a1, a2 ∈ V ert,
g(e, a1), g(e, a2) ∈ Edg is inconsistent if a1 6= a2 (Fig. 9(c)).
We will therefore assume that graphs are composable, i.e.,
for every e ∈ VJ , and for any a1 ∈ V ert1, a2 ∈ V ert2 such
that g(e, a1) ∈ Edg1, g(e, a2) ∈ Edg2, a1 = a2 must hold.
With this assumption, the composition operator defined here
can be combined with the“composable abstraction”operator
defined in Sec. 2.4 (Def. 3), to answer a provenance query of
the form prov(y′). Using these two operators, query answer-
ing meets the two main requirements stated at the end of
Sec. 3.1, namely (i) to return provenance paths of maximal
length, given all the provenance graphs contributions from
each of the partners, and (ii) to comply with the sharing
policies of each partner relative to the partner that issues
the query. Specifically, the answer to the example query is
computed as:
prov(y′) = absC(absC(pg1 ⊕ pg2, pol(A,C)), pol(B,C))
To summarize, in this model each partner who produces
provenance graphs alongside data, may (but does not have
to) send such provenance graphs to a central trusted partner,
T . Additionally, partners entrust T with a specification of
their provenance sharing policies, one for each other partner
in the network, and delegate all further operations on their
graphs to T . In return for volunteering such information,
T is able to answer provenance queries originated by any
partner, taking all available graphs and policies into account.
A prototype architecture that supports the functionality of
partner T is currently being developed.
4. SUMMARY AND FURTHERWORK
We have described a model and algorithm for performing
abstractions on provenance graphs, and we have presented
a scenario where abstraction is used to enable privacy-
preserving sharing of provenance graphs across a network of
partners. The main motivation for this work comes from
the observation that, increasingly, data sharing must oc-
cur amongst partners who agree to collaborate towards a
common goal (be it a business relationship, joint emergency
response, etc.), but at the same time are not prepared to
blindly trust the data they receive from other partners. In
this setting, we conjecture that sharing the provenance of
the data may increase the usefulness of the data that is ex-
changed, and we explore the consequences of sharing prove-
nance graphs. Such graphs, however, may encode aspects
of a partner’s process model, as well as references to private
data, which partners are reluctant to share. Our model for
provenance graph abstraction makes it possible for partners
to share some aspects of provenance while preserving the
privacy of others. Abstraction is based on a simple policy
model, consisting of a set of nodes in the graph that are to
be abstracted out. We show that in order to preserve the
consistency of the original graph, the abstraction algorithm
may need to include additional nodes that were not initially
required to be abstracted. Current work is focused on ex-
tending the abstraction algorithm to a richer provenance
model, that comes closer to the complete PROV reference
model. This includes a stronger notion of consistency to be
applied both to abstraction and to composition.
In the second part of the paper, we have described an ex-
tension of the provenance exchange scenario, where some of
the shared data is used by other partners to produce new
data, and therefore new provenance, which can then itself
be shared, producing a propagation effect across a network
of partners. A different policy may be defined amongst each
pair of partners, a sender and a receiver. This scenario re-
quires provenance fragments to be composed, while differ-
ent abstractions are applied to each fragment, depending on
the privacy policy of the fragment’s owner relative to the
receiver of the compound provenance graph. In this interac-
tion model, partners send their data to other partners, and
send the associated provenance to a separate trusted part-
ner, T , who is responsible for performing composition and
abstraction. The advantage of this model is its simplicity:
partners “send and forget”, and all requests for compound
provenance graphs are directed to T .
The current model offers a fully functional sharing infras-
tructure for provenance data. In our future work, we shall
be looking into two major extensions that will remove the
need for a centralised trusted entity, and extend the current
policy language. In the former, T is removed and partners
are themselves responsible for answering provenance queries
about the provenance fragments that they have produced,
in line with the sharing policy relative to the requester, and
composition must preserve this hiding. The latter will look
into expanding the policy language beyond just specifying
the list of nodes to be restricted to include nodes that have
to be retained to preserve the core provenance information,
as well as combinations of removed and retained nodes that
should be disallowed. Furthermore, additional strategies for
specifying abstraction chunks will be explored for different
intended purposes of the abstraction.
5. REFERENCES
[1] D. Andrews, editor. Information technology -
Programming languages, their environments and
system software interfaces - Vienna Development
Method - Specification Language - Part 1: Base
language. International Organization for
Standardization, December 1996. International
Standard ISO/IEC 13817-1.
[2] K. Belhajjame, R. B’Far, J. Cheney, S. Coppens,
S. Cresswell, Y. Gil, P. Groth, G. Klyne, T. Lebo,
J. McCusker, S. Miles, J. Myers, S. Sahoo, and
C. Tilmes. PROV-DM: The PROV Data Model.
Technical report.
[3] S. Bhagat, G. Cormode, B. Krishnamurthy, and
D. Srivastava. Class-based graph anonymization for
social network data. Proc. VLDB Endow.,
2(1):766–777, Aug. 2009.
[4] O. Biton, S. C. Boulakia, S. B. Davidson, and C. S.
Hara. Querying and Managing Provenance through
User Views in Scientific Workflows. In ICDE, pages
1072–1081, 2008.
[5] J. Bryans and J. S. Fitzgerald. Formal Engineering of
XACML Access Control Policies in VDM++. In
M. Butler, M. G. Hinchey, and M. M. Larrondo-Petrie,
editors, ICFEM, volume 4789 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 37–56. Springer, 2007.
[6] J. Bryans, J. S. Fitzgerald, C. B. Jones, and
I. Mozolevsky. Formal modelling of dynamic
coalitions, with an application in chemical engineering.
In ISoLA, pages 91–98. IEEE, 2006.
[7] G. Chang, C. B. Roth, C. L. Reyes, O. Pornillos, Y.-J.
Chen, and A. P. Chen. Retraction. Science,
314(5807):1875, 2006.
[8] J. Cheney, P. Missier, and L. Moreau. Constraints of
the Provenance Data Model. Technical report.
[9] S. B. Davidson, S. Khanna, T. Milo, D. Panigrahi, and
S. Roy. Provenance views for module privacy. In
Proceedings of the thirtieth ACM
SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles
of database systems, PODS ’11, pages 175–186, New
York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[10] S. B. Davidson, S. Khanna, S. Roy, and S. C.
Boulakia. Privacy issues in scientific workflow
provenance. In P. Missier, V. Curcin, and
S. Dadvidson, editors, First International Workshop
on Workflow Approaches to New Data-centric Science
(WANDS’10), Indianapolis, 2010. ACM.
[11] S. B. Davidson, S. Khanna, S. Roy, J. Stoyanovich,
V. Tannen, and Y. Chen. On provenance and privacy.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Database Theory, ICDT ’11, pages 3–10, New York,
NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[12] S. Dey, D. Zinn, and B. Luda¨scher. ProPub: Towards
a Declarative Approach for Publishing Customized,
Policy-Aware Provenance. In J. Bayard Cushing,
J. French, and S. Bowers, editors, Scientific and
Statistical Database Management, volume 6809 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 225–243.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2011.
[13] Editorial. Closing the Climategate. Nature, 468(345),
2010.
[14] C. B. Jones. Systematic software development using
VDM (2. ed.). Prentice Hall International Series in
Computer Science. Prentice Hall, 1991.
[15] K. Liu and E. Terzi. Towards identity anonymization
on graphs. In Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGMOD
international conference on Management of data,
SIGMOD ’08, pages 93–106, New York, NY, USA,
2008. ACM.
[16] P. Missier, B. Ludascher, S. Bowers, M. K. Anand,
I. Altintas, S. Dey, A. Sarkar, B. Shrestha, and
C. Goble. Linking Multiple Workflow Provenance
Traces for Interoperable Collaborative Science. In
Proc.s 5th Workshop on Workflows in Support of
Large-Scale Science (WORKS), 2010.
[17] A. Morin, J. Urban, P. D. Adams, I. Foster, A. Sali,
D. Baker, and P. Sliz. Shining Light into Black Boxes.
Science, 336(6078):159–160, 2012.
[18] R. Peng. Reproducible Research in Computational
Science. Science, 334(6060):1226–1127, Dec. 2011.
[19] E. Zheleva and L. Getoor. Preserving the Privacy of
Sensitive Relationships in Graph Data. In F. Bonchi,
E. Ferrari, B. Malin, and Y. Saygin, editors, Privacy,
Security, and Trust in KDD, volume 4890 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 153–171. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2008.
[20] B. Zhou, J. Pei, and W. Luk. A brief survey on
anonymization techniques for privacy preserving
publishing of social network data. SIGKDD Explor.
Newsl., 10(2):12–22, Dec. 2008.
APPENDIX
A. THE PROPUB EXAMPLE
The work most closely related to ours is presented in [12], in
which an algorithm for hiding parts of a provenance graph
is given. Here, we demonstrate Alg. 1 using the graph and
example from [12]. A number of operations are given in that
paper; Alg. 1 corresponds most closely to the abstraction
operation. The graph used is reproduced in Figure 10.
The set of nodes to be removed is {d14, s1,m1}. Ex-
tending these to a-nodes (line 4, using algorithm 4) gives
{s1, s2, s3, d14,m1} as the set of elements to be removed.
The algorithm then identifies the cause boundary nodes
(given by algorithm 3, and in this case contains only the
node {m1}), and the effect boundary nodes (which are given
by algorithm 2, and in are this case {s1, s2, s3}). The paths
between nodes in cause boundary set and the effect bound-
ary set are calculated, and these nodes gives us a new value
for the variable Remove (= {s1, s2, s3, d13, d14,m1}.)
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Figure 10: Graph used to illustrate privacy policies
in ProPub
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Figure 11: Result of abstraction with policy
{d14, s1,m1}
At this point, Remove′ 6= Remove so the process needs
to be repeated from line 2. The second iteration does
not further change the value of Remove, (it remains
{s1, s2, s3, d13, d14,m1} and so the algorithm exits the
repeat-until loop and continues from line 9. Line 9 adds the
new abstract node nabs. Lines 10-19 perform the “rewiring”
of the graph, which create the links to nabs and removes the
links to nodes in Remove, and finally line 20 removes the
set Remove of nodes to be abstracted out.
The resulting abstracted graph is shown in Fig. 11 and is
identical to the one generated by the Propub operation sys-
tem, however we compute this result directly, without cre-
ating and then repairing graph consistency violations.
